The biggest risk with nuclear power isn't the reactors. It's the people.

The New York Times reports major concerns were raised in the early 70's about the General Electric "Mark 1" nuclear reactor containment vessels. This is the sort of containment vessel experiencing severe problems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant following the disastrous earthquake in Japan last week.

The NY Times story says*:

"In 1972, Stephen H. Hanauer, then a safety official with the Atomic Energy Commission, recommended in a memo that the sort of “pressure-suppression” system used in G.E.’s Mark 1 plants presented unacceptable safety risks and that it should be discontinued. Among his concerns were that the smaller containment design was more susceptible to explosion and rupture from a buildup in hydrogen — a situation that may have unfolded at the Fukushima Daiichi plant.
“What are the safety advantages of pressure suppression, apart from the cost saving?” Mr. Hanauer asked in the 1972 memo. (The regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission were later transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.)" 

So what happened?

"A written response came later that same year from Joseph Hendrie, who would later become chairman of the N.R.C. He called the idea of a ban on such systems “attractive” because alternative containment systems have the “notable advantage of brute simplicity in dealing with a primary blowdown.”

"But he added that the technology had been so widely accepted by the industry and regulatory officials that “reversal of this hallowed policy, particularly at this time, could well be the end of nuclear power.”"

OK, so Hanauer and Hendrie both agree there are problems with this container vessel design. Hanhauer wants something done about it, while Hendrie is happy to just talk about it. It's too late to be safe. The industry comes first, above all else. In effect.

Let's now note that the AEC was dis-established two years later in 1974 and replaced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  Joseph Hendrie was a Commissioner on the new body and was Chair of the NRC from 1979 to 1981. Dr Hendrie's bio on the NRC site makes it clear he was a constant player in safety and risk assessment at both the AEC and the NRC.

Reading the NRC web site, their official history says:

"Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Before the NRC was created, nuclear regulation was the responsibility of the AEC, which Congress first established in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Eight years later, Congress replaced that law with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which for the first time made the development of commercial nuclear power possible. The act assigned the AEC the functions of both encouraging the use of nuclear power and regulating its safety. The AEC's regulatory programs sought to ensure public health and safety from the hazards of nuclear power without imposing excessive requirements that would inhibit the growth of the industry. This was a difficult goal to achieve, especially in a new industry, and within a short time the AEC's programs stirred considerable controversy. An increasing number of critics during the 1960s charged that the AEC's regulations were insufficiently rigorous in several important areas, including radiation protection standards, reactor safety, plant siting, and environmental protection."

The move to the NRC was intended to separate the promotion of nuclear power from the regulation of it.

On the issue of the GE Mark1 container vessel the regulatory change appears to have had no effect. Though Dr. Hendrie agreed with Mr. Hanhauer about his concerns, nothing was done and many of these reactor vessels remain in use today, with no plans to change that situation anywhere in view.

One could be forgiven for speculating that the regulatory change was, at least in part, window dressing and may - as these things often go - have actually been an opportunity for the nuclear inductry to gain more control over their own regulation. Clearly, Dr. Hendrie's  "go along to get along" approach (an approach the old AEC had been criticised for), with respect to the safety of the Mark 1, appears to have won the day on the Mark 1 container vessel issue at the very least...and it did so with Dr. Hendrie's active involvement as a Commissioner and then as Chair of the NRC. I'm not blaming him. I'm certain he wasn't alone in his view. That's the problem, really.

This is one of the major reasons I have serious reservations about nuclear power. Never mind the technology itself and whether or not it can be made sound. The most predictable source of risk is the human failing of placing self-interest or corporate interest over the wider community interest. "Capture" of the regulatory body that is supposed to guarantee public safety by the industry being regulated can see risks remain unaddressed with cost being the over-riding concern and public safety - absolute safety - coming second at best.

I have read a fair bit on this  topic in the past few days. I'm a long way from being fully informed. So far, most of the words are laudible and cannot be faulted. The values of the companies and regulatory bodies are sound. But if we ignore the fine words and look at what they actually DID....then a somewhat different picture emerges. Economic "pragmatism" won out over concerns about risk to public safety. That isn't good enough. Not when dealing with technologies like nuclear power, that can poison a part of the Earth for generations to come.

* I include extracts from the articles I cite as the articles often disappear from view and the substance supporting any case being made is thus removed.